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Tax Treatment of the PEPP: The New Pan-European
Personal Pension Product
Bas Dieleman*
Regulation 2019/1238 concerning a pan-European personal pension product has entered into force on 14 August 2019. As a result, it
becomes much easier for EU citizens to contribute to a personal pension product on a voluntary basis. It is expected that as from
2021, financial institutions are able to offer a pan-European personal pension product (PEPP) to EU citizens. The tax treatment of
the PEPP is not included in the Regulation. However, ECJ case law on tax treatment of private pension products is applicable. In this
article, the tax treatment of the PEPP is analysed. The focus of this article is on tax related aspects in case of contributions to a PEPP
in one Member State, while receiving PEPP retirement benefits in another Member State. The article among other discusses granting
tax incentives to the PEPP by Member States, taxation of PEPP retirement benefits in case a tax treaty is applicable and taxation in
case the accumulated capital of a PEPP or the saver moves to another Member State.
Keywords: PEPP, pan-European personal pension product, pensions, retirement benefits, portability service, tax incentives, tax relief, tax
treaties, exit tax
1 INTRODUCTION
Regulation 2019/1238 concerning a pan-European per-
sonal pension product (hereafter the Regulation) has
entered into force on 14 August 2019.1 As a result, it
becomes much easier for EU citizens to contribute to a
personal pension product on a voluntary basis. It is
expected that as from 2021, financial institutions are
able to offer a pan-European personal pension product
(hereafter PEPP) to EU citizens. The tax treatment of the
PEPP is not included in the Regulation. However, ECJ
case law on tax treatment of private pension products is
applicable.
In this article, I will analyse the tax treatment of the
PEPP. The focus of this article is on tax related aspects in
case of contributions to a PEPP in one Member State,
while receiving PEPP retirement benefits in another
Member State. The design of this article is as follows.
Paragraph 2 discusses the background and main features
of the PEPP. In paragraph 3, I will analyse if Member
States shall grant tax incentives for contributions to a
PEPP. In paragraph 4, I will discuss how PEPP retire-
ment benefits will be taxed, especially in case a tax treaty
is applicable. Paragraph 5 elaborates on taxation in case
of a transfer of a PEPP to a provider in another Member
State and paragraph 6 discusses exit taxes in case a saver
moves to another Member State. Paragraph 7 contains
the summary and conclusions of this article.
2 BACKGROUND AND MAIN FEATURES
2.1 Background
The PEPP is the (European) Commission’s response to its
wish to supplement existing state pensions and occupa-
tional pension schemes. In most Member States, citizens
hardly participate in (mandatory) occupational pension
schemes, the second pillar pension. Only 27% of EU
citizens between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-nine
participates in an occupational pension scheme and
within the EU there are a big differences between the
participation rate of employees in occupational pension
schemes.2 From that point of view, the Commission’s
wish to introduce a pension product such as the PEPP is
understandable. According to the Commission, the
Regulation will contribute to the mobility of workers
within the EU. Research on behalf of the Commission
shows that all Member States already have a personal
pension product (hereafter local personal pension pro-
duct), but that the characteristics and the tax treatment
of these products are vastly different.3 In addition, the
Commission states that the PEPP will lead to an addi-
tional accumulated pension capital of EUR 700 billion in
the coming decade alone.4
In someMember States, for example the Netherlands and
Finland, almost all employees participate in an occupational
pension scheme. This implies that in those Member States
* PhD, tax and pension advisor at Loyens & Loeff N.V., researcher at
the Expert Centre Pension Law of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
Email: bas.dieleman@loyensloeff.com.
1 Regulation (EU) 2019/1238 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 20 June 2019.
2 EC, factsheet: A Pan-European Personal Pension Product (26 June
2017).
3 EY, Study on the feasibility of a European Personal Pension Framework
(June 2017.)
4 EC, supra n. 2.
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and from an employee perspective, there appears to be
limited demand for a new pension product. However, in
for example Greece, Portugal and Spain, less than 10% of
all employees participate in an occupational pension
scheme.5 In those Member States, a PEPP could improve
retirement savings by employees significantly. The PEPP
could especially be useful for young EU citizens who have
more and more often a career in multiple Member States. 6
Furthermore, the PEPP could be attractive for the self-
employed and other entrepreneurs, because these workers
are generally not obliged to participate in an occupational
pension scheme.
The Commission published the proposal for the
Regulation in June 2017. The amended proposal was
adopted by the European Parliament in June 2019. The
Netherlands is the only Member State which has voted
against the Regulation. This vote was the result of a
motion from the Dutch House of Representatives. In
this motion, the House of Representatives argued that
pensions are matter of Member States and there is no
need for pension related legislation on an European
level.7 Since the Regulation did not require an unani-
mous vote, the vote of the Netherlands against the
Regulation did not really matter. According to the
Regulation, the European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Authority (hereafter EIOPA) has until 15
August 2020 to develop regulatory standards, which
are particularly related to the PEPP passport which will
be discussed hereafter. Twelve months after the publica-
tion of these regulatory standards, which is next year, it
is possible for providers to start offering a PEPP.
2.2 Main Features of the PEPP
According to Article 2 of the Regulation, a PEPP is an
individual and voluntary pension product which is not
an occupational pension scheme. This product has the
explicit purpose of providing income on retirement. The
aforementioned article implies that the PEPP is a third
pillar product (hereafter a personal pension product).8
Among others the Dutch government also views the
PEPP as a personal pension product.9 The Regulation
does not harmonize or replace local personal pension
products, but it harmonizes the so-called core features of
a PEPP. If a personal pension product contains these
core features, the provider of this product can request
the competent authorities of a Member State to qualify as
a PEPP. If this request is granted, the competent
authorities of the Member State must inform EIOPA
and EIOPA will then include the product in the public
PEPP register which it shall develop. As mentioned in
Consideration 28 of the Regulation, the registration in
the PEPP register effectively results in a common PEPP
passport.
As indicated above, a personal pension product must
contain certain core features in order to qualify as a PEPP.
Apart from obtaining a PEPP passport, the core features are
distribution and provision of information, the investment
policy, switching to another provider and cross-border sup-
ply and cross-border portability. Hereafter, I briefly elaborate
on these core features.
With regard to distribution, Article 24 of the Regulation
states all that information regarding the PEPP must be pro-
vided free of charge and electronically to the PEPP saver
(hereafter saver). With regard to the provision of informa-
tion, the PEPP Key Information Document as mentioned in
Article 26 of the Regulation is particularly important. This
document contains pre-contractual information regarding
the PEPP and must be placed on the website of the PEPP
provider (hereinafter the provider).
The Regulation includes various provisions regarding
investment policy. Providers must invest in accordance
with the prudent person rule. A provider is allowed to
offer six investment options to the saver. For the option
with the lowest investment risks, the so-called basic
PEPP,10 Article 45 of the Regulation states that the
costs and fees to be charged, shall not exceed 1% of
the accumulated capital. Providers could be reluctant of
offer a PEPP because of this limit on costs and fees.11
For this article, the most important core feature of the
PEPP is the portability service. As mentioned elsewhere,12
this is the core feature which gives the PEPP a lot of added
value compared to local personal pension products.
Generally, local personal products do not have a portability
service. According to Article 17 of the Regulation, the
portability service implies that if a saver moves to another
Member State, he or she has the right to continue to
contribute to a PEPP. According to Article 18 of the
Regulation, a provider must provide the portability service
at the request of the saver. For example, if a resident of
Spain contributes to a PEPP which is administered by a
provider which is established in Spain, the provider will
allow a continued contribution to the PEPP by the saver,
after the saver has become a resident of France. As noted
elsewhere, the portability service is also helpful in case
there is a lack of trust in the financial sector in a certain
Member State.13 For the sake of completeness, I note that
5 OCED, Pensions at Glance 2019, figure 3.4.
6 PensionsEurope, Position Paper on the Pan-European Personal Pension
Product (26 Jan. 2018).
7 Proceedings Dutch House of Representatives, 2017–2018, 21 501–
07, no. 1435.
8 E. Lutjens, E. A. P. Schouten & M. C. W. Tomeij, Reactie op ‘De
pensioen opPEPPer?’, Tijdschrift Pensioenvraagstukken 2018/7,
para. 2.
9 Proceedings Dutch House of Representatives (2017–2018), 22 112,
2432, at 16–17.
10 For more details, H. van Meeren & A. K. R. Wouters, The PEPP
Regulation; Pepper for the Capital Markets Union?, Zeitschrift fur
Verzicherungsrecht 2019/14.
11 G. Moss, PEPP: Time to Get Personal, IPE Magazine (Jan. 2020).
12 H. van Meerten & A. K. R. Wouters, De PEPP-Verordening; quo
vadis?, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht, 2019-3/4.
13 M. Calu & C. Stanciu, An Insight of the Future – Pan-European
Pension Product, semanticscholar.org (2018).
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the Regulation does not require that a provider offers a
PEPP that enable contributions by residents of all Member
States as from the first day the product is available.
In order to ensure that a saver can continue to con-
tribute to a PEPP regardless the Member State where he
or she resides, Article 19 of the Regulation states that the
PEPP has a sub-account for each applicable Member
State. A sub-account is a national component of a
PEPP, which component meets the legal requirements
of personal pension products of a certain Member State.
The idea behind the sub-accounts is that this should
stimulate granting tax incentives to a PEPP, which will
be discussed in paragraph 3.
Another core feature of the PEPP which is relevant for
this article, is the switching service. According to Article
52 of the Regulation, the switching service gives a saver
the right to have the accumulated capital transferred to
another provider during the accumulation phase of the
PEPP. This right, which arises five years after the con-
clusion of the PEPP agreement, also exists in case a saver
wants to transfer his accumulated capital to a provider
which is established in another Member State, even if the
saver does not live in that state.
Offering a PEPP is possible for financial institutions as
mentioned in Article 6 of the Regulation. In short, these
are credit institutions, banks, investment institutions,
insurers and pension funds, which are established in
the EU. Upon request of the Netherlands,14 the
Regulation stipulates that pension funds cannot offer a
PEPP if the legislation of the Member State concerned
does not allow that pension funds offer personal pension
products. As a result, pension funds are not allowed to
offer a PEPP in some Member States, including the
Netherlands.
3 TAX TREATMENT DURING THE ACCUMULATION
PHASE
The Regulation does not include the tax treatment of the
PEPP. The Commission has deliberately opted for this.
Adjusting or harmonizing national tax regimes (for per-
sonal pension products) requires unanimous support
from the Member States,15 which is generally not feasi-
ble. This leaves the tax treatment of the PEPP to the
Member States. However, this tax treatment is crucial
to make the PEPP a success in the long term. As indi-
cated in section 2.1, it appears that all Member States
currently have at least one local personal pension pro-
duct and that there are tax incentives for all of these
products.16 This observation is important because if
there is no tax relief for contributions to a PEPP in a
certain Member State, while there is tax relief for con-
tributions to a local personal pension product, it is fair to
assume that citizens choose the local product instead of
the PEPP.
In order to encourage Member States to grant tax
incentives to the PEPP, the Commission has issued a
recommendation on the tax treatment of personal pen-
sion products.17 In this recommendation, the
Commission refers to the ECJ ruling in case C-422/
01.18 In this case, the ECJ has ruled that it is a violation
of (currently) Article 56 TFEU, if an insurance policy
concluded with an insurer established in another
Member State, which insurance policy meets all the
conditions for occupational pension insurance in
national law except the condition that it has been con-
cluded with an insurer established in the national terri-
tory, is treated less favourable for tax purposes compared
to local insurance products. As mentioned elsewhere,19
Member States are therefore in principle obliged to grant
tax incentives to the PEPP, provided that the PEPP is
properly designed.
Assuming that Member States grant tax incentives to a
PEPP, it is unrealistic to expect that those tax incentives
are more generous that tax incentives for local personal
pension products. If this were the case, savers might try
to move contributions which previously have been made
to those local personal pension products. This will have
a negative impact on local personal products.20
With regard to the aforementioned proper design of
the PEPP, the sub-accounts referred to in paragraph 2
are of great importance. This allows a provider to adjust
the features of a PEPP per sub-account to the conditions
of tax relief for personal pension products applicable in a
Member State. As a result, it is for example possible that
a saver can contribute EUR 2,000 a year while living in
Member State A, while he or she can contribute EUR
10,000 a year after moving to Member State B.
Since granting tax incentives to a PEPP is a matter of
the Member States, the amount of tax relief as well as the
conditions for obtaining tax relief, are expected to differ
in each Member States. In for example the Netherlands,
the government has confirmed that if a sub-account of a
PEPP is designed in such a way that the conditions of
Articles 3.124 to 3.127 of the Personal Income Tax Act
2001 are met, there will be tax relief for contributions to
a PEPP. An important condition is that the annual con-
tributions are in principle capped at EUR 12,986 (2020
14 Proceedings Dutch Senate (2018–2019), 34,850, Letter of the
Dutch Minister of Finance dated 18 June 2018.
15 EC, Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal of the Regulation, COM
(2017)343, at 10.
16 EY, Study on the feasibility of a European Personal Pension Framework
261 (June 2017).
17 EC, Commission Recommendation of 29 June 2017 on Tax Treatment of
Personal Pension Products, C(2017) 4393.
18 ECJ 26 June 2003, Skandia and Ramstedt, C-422/01, ECLI:EU:
C:2003:380.
19 B. Dieleman, Internationale fiscale aspecten van het PEPP, Weekblad
Fiscaal Recht 2020/10, para. 3.
20 Arbeitsgemeinschaft fur betriebliche Altersverzorgung, position
paper on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation
on a pan-European Personal Pension Product (PEPP), 17 Oct.
2017.
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figure).21 Another important condition is that upon
retirement, a saver cannot receive the accumulated capi-
tal as a lump sum payment. If the conditions of the
aforementioned articles are met, the contributions for
personal pension products are deductible for income
tax purposes, while the corresponding retirement bene-
fits are taxable. Furthermore, the accumulated capital is
exempt from to taxation of wealth. As I have mentioned
elsewhere,22 providers established in the Netherlands as
well as providers established in other Member States,
should be able to meet all conditions as mentioned in
the Articles 3.124 to 3.127 of the Personal Income Tax
Act 2001. However, this could require significant admin-
istration costs.
4 TAXATION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS
As indicated in paragraph 3, Member States are in prin-
ciple obliged to give the PEPP the same tax treatment as
local pension products, provided that a sub-account of
the PEPP is properly designed. Most Member States will
have little objection to this obligation with regard to
PEPP retirement benefits, because retirement benefits
related to personal pension products are subject to tax
in most Member States.23 Regarding this matter it is
relevant that based on ECJ case law,24 if there is no tax
relief for a PEPP during the accumulation phase,
Member States are in principle required to exempt
PEPP retirement benefits. As a result, it is in principle
not possible that if there were no tax relief during the
accumulation phase and the saver resides in a Member
State during the payment of PEPP retirement benefits,
that those retirement benefits are taxable. It is of course
possible that the saver is residing outside the EU while
receiving PEPP retirement benefits. If this is the case, the
state of residence of the saver in principle will not have
to take the aforementioned case law into account.
If the saver has contributed to a PEPP in several
Member States or if the saver does not reside in the
Member State of the provider, the question is which
state or states are entitled to tax the PEPP retirement
benefits. If the states concerned have concluded a bilat-
eral tax treaty (hereafter tax treaty), the answer to this
question is in principle included in this tax treaty. If no
tax treaty applies, a saver will usually have to rely on
legislation for the avoidance of double taxation of the
Member State in which the saver is a resident.
If the pension related clauses of a tax treaty are in
accordance with the OECD Model Tax Convention,
PEPP retirement benefits will be taxed in the state of
residence of the saver only. It does not matter whether
the retirement benefits are paid as an annuity or as a
lump sum. It is important to note that Article 18 of the
OECD Model Tax Convention applies to occupational
pensions only. As a result, Article 21 of the aforemen-
tioned convention is applicable to PEPP retirement ben-
efits. As noted elsewhere,25 it is important that if a tax
treaty does provide for taxation in the state of residence
of the saver only, while PEPP retirement benefits are
subject to withholding tax in state of residence of the
provider, the procedures to reclaim this withholding tax
should be transparent and efficient.
The pension related provisions of tax treaties often
deviate from the OECD Model Tax Convention. I will
discuss the four most common deviations hereafter. The
first common deviation (from the OECD Model Tax
Convention) is that a tax treaty does not make a distinc-
tion between occupational pensions and personal pen-
sions, which in practice means that the tax treaty
contains one provision which covers both types of pen-
sions. An example of a tax treaty with such a deviation is
the tax treaty between Spain and Portugal. If this is the
case, PEPP retirement benefits will be taxed in the state
of residence of the saver only. In this case, it again does
not matter whether the retirement benefits are paid as an
annuity or as a lump sum.
The second common deviation is that the pension
related provisions of a tax treaty (1) do not make a
distinction between occupational pensions and personal
pensions and (2) state that lump sum payments may also
be taxed in the state of residence of the provider, if the
state of residence of the provider has granted tax relief
for the pension during the accumulation phase. An
example of a tax treaty with such a deviation is the tax
treaty between Italy and the Netherlands. In this case,
PEPP retirement benefits which are paid as annuities are
taxed in the state of residence of the saver only.
However, PEPP retirement benefits which are paid as a
lump sum, may also be taxed by the state of residence of
the provider.
The third common deviation is that the pension
related provisions of tax treaty (1) do not make a dis-
tinction between occupational pensions and personal
pensions, (2) state that lump sum payments may also
be taxed in the state of residence of the provider and (3)
state that annuities may also be taxed in the state of
residence of the provider if certain conditions are met.
These conditions generally imply that the state of resi-
dence of the provider did provide tax relief during the
accumulation phase of the pension and that the state of
residence of the saver does not tax the retirement bene-
fits. An example of a tax treaty with such a deviation is
the tax treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands. In
21 For more details, B. Dieleman & J. Post, Fiscale aspecten van het
nieuwe pan-Europees persoonlijk pensioenproduct, Maandblad
Belastingbeschouwingen 2019–10, para. 3.
22 B. Dieleman, Internationale fiscale aspecten van het PEPP, Weekblad
Fiscaal Recht 2020/10, para. 3.
23 EY, Study on the feasibility of a European Personal Pension Framework,
June 2017, table 1.
24 ECJ 3 Oct. 2002, Danner, C-136/00.
25 Irish Funds, White Paper on the Pan-European Personal Pension
Product (June 2017).
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this case, PEPP retirement benefits which are paid as
annuities are taxed in the state of residence of the saver
only, unless the national legislation of this state does not
result in such taxation. Furthermore, PEPP retirement
benefits which are paid as a lump sum, may also be
taxed in the state of residence of the provider. As men-
tioned elsewhere,26 the aforementioned deviation
implies that Member States will not lose tax revenues
in case they have granted tax relief to the PEPP in
accumulation phase, while the saver resides in another
(Member) State during the payment of retirement bene-
fits. As a result, the PEPP is an additional incentive for
Member States to renegotiate the pension related provi-
sions of their tax treaties.
The fourth common deviation is that the pension
related provisions of a tax treaty (1) do not make a
distinction between occupational pensions and personal
pensions, (2) state that lump sum payments may also be
taxed in the state of residence of the provider and (3)
state that annuities may also be taxed in the state of
residence of the provider, but that such a taxation may
not exceed 15% or 20% of the annuities. An example of
a tax treaty with such a deviation is the tax treaty
between Finland and Estonia. In this case, PEPP retire-
ment benefits which are paid as annuities, may be taxed
in the state of residence of the saver as well as the state of
residence of the provider. Furthermore, PEPP retirement
benefits which are paid as a lump sum, may be taxed in
the state of residence of the saver as well.
5 TAX ISSUES OF THE SWITCHING SERVICE
As indicated in paragraph 2, one of the core features of
the PEPP is the switching service, which gives a saver the
right to have the accumulated capital transferred to
another provider during the accumulation phase of the
PEPP. In the case of a switch between two providers
which are established in the same Member State, it is
in my opinion unlikely that significant tax issues arise. In
this case, there are for example no incentives for Member
States to tax the accumulated capital upon a switch of
provider. However, such tax issues are likely to occur in
case of switch to a provider which is established in
another Member State. In this case, a Member State
could for example tax the accumulated capital upon
the switch of provider in order to reclaim the tax relief
which has been granted during the accumulation phase
of the PEPP. For example, in the Netherlands, Article
3.133 of the Personal Income Tax Act 2001 states that in
the event of such a switch, the tax relief which is granted
in the accumulation phase of a personal pension product
is in principle fully reversed. In addition, an additional
20% interest is due. Taking into account the top rate
from Dutch personal income tax, the accumulated capi-
tal is taxed at 69.5% in the year of the switch. As noted
elsewhere,27 such tax rates imply that no reasonable
saver will exercise the right to transfer the PEPP to a
provider established in another Member State.
One could claim that if a Member State taxes the
accumulated capital of a PEPP upon a switch to a provi-
der which is established in another Member State, while
the accumulated capital is not subject to tax in case of a
switch between two providers which are established in
the same Member State, there is a violation of the TFEU.
Such a claim could for example be supported by the
recent decision of the Commission to send a reasoned
opinion related to the Dutch tax legislation on the trans-
fer of occupational pensions to other Member States.28
However, one could also argue that because of the port-
ability of the PEPP, there is no significant obstacle for
savers to move to another Member State from a personal
pensions perspective. As mentioned in paragraph 2, the
portability enables that savers who move to another
Member State, can continue to contribute to a PEPP
which is administered by a certain provider, while
using a sub-account of the PEPP.
6 EXIT TAXES
At the beginning of the century, the ECJ has already
decided that exit taxes by a Member State in case of
unrealized capital gains of an EU citizen moving to
another Member State, are a violation of the TFEU.29
Furthermore, the ECJ has decided that a preservative tax
assessment which effectively postpones an exit tax for
capital gains until the aforementioned gains have been
realized, are a violation of the TFEU, if the conditions of
the postponement of the exit tax are too difficult to
meet.30 The Supreme Court of the Netherlands has
decided that the aforementioned ECJ case law is also
applicable to preservative tax assessments for pensions.31
Considering the aforementioned case law, it is hard to
imagine that if a saver has obtained tax relief for a PEPP
in a certain Member State and the saver moves to
another Member State, the Member State which has
granted the tax relief, levies an exit tax related to the
PEPP which needs to be paid immediately. However, it is
still possible that in case a saver has obtained tax relief
for a PEPP in a certain Member State and the saver
moves to another Member State, the Member State
which has granted the tax relief will issue a preservative
26 P. Kavelaars, Fiscale onevenwichtigheden, Tijdschrift voor
Pensioenvraagstukken, 2017/33.
27 B. Dieleman, Internationale fiscale aspecten van het PEPP, Weekblad
Fiscaal Recht 2020/10, para. 5.
28 EC 27 Nov. 2019, Nov. infringement package, https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_19_6304.
29 For example, ECJ 14 Mar. 2004, case C-9/02 (Hughes de Lasteyrie
du Saillant).
30 ECJ 7 Sept. 2006, case C-470/04 (N).
31 Dutch Supreme Court 15 Apr. 2011, case no. ECLI:NL:HR:2011:
BN8728.
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tax assessment which postpones an exit tax for the
accumulated capital of a PEPP as long as certain condi-
tions are met. If for example a saver would obtain tax
relief for a PEPP while residing in the Netherlands, the
Netherlands will issue such a preservative tax assessment
based on Article 3.136 of the Personal Income Tax Act
2001. This preservative tax assessment will for example
result in an exit tax which has to be paid immediately, if
the PEPP retirement benefits are paid as a lump sum.
7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I have analysed the tax treatment of the
PEPP. The PEPP is the pan-European personal pension
product which is introduced by Regulation 2019/1238. It
is expected that providers can start offering a PEPP to EU
citizens as from 2021. An important feature of the PEPP is
the portability. As a result of the portability service, provi-
ders shall upon request arrange that if a saver moves to
another Member State, the saver can continue to contribute
to the PEPP through a sub-account. Another important
feature of the PEPP is the switching service. The switching
service gives the saver the right to transfer the accumulated
capital of a PEPP to a provider, regardless the state of
residence of the saver or the provider. The tax treatment
of the PEPP is not included in the Regulation. However,
based on ECJ case law, it can be concluded that Member
States are in principle obliged to grant tax incentives to the
PEPP, if a sub-account is designed properly.
The taxation of PEPP retirement benefits is straight-
forward if the saver continues to live in the state of
residence of the provider. The taxation of PEPP retire-
ment benefits is generally covered by tax treaties in
case the saver has contributed to PEPP while residing
in several Member States or if the saver does not
reside in the state of residence of the provider. The
pension related provisions of tax treaties frequently
deviate from the OECD Model Tax Convention. In
this article, I have discussed the most frequent devia-
tions as well the outcome of these deviations on the
taxation of PEPP retirement benefits. Furthermore, it
has been concluded that taxation upon transferring the
accumulated capital of a PEPP to a provider in another
Member State is possible. If such taxation is expected,
it is unlikely that savers will opt for the switching
service of a PEPP. Finally, it is concluded that based
on ECJ case law, it is hard to imagine that if a saver
has obtained tax relief for the PEPP in a certain
Member State and the saver moves to another
Member State, the Member State which has granted
the tax relief levies an exit tax which needs to be paid
immediately.
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